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Defense-in-depth is a fundamental safety principle for the design and operation of nuclear power plants. Despite its
general appeal, defense-in-depth is not without its drawbacks, which include its potential for concealing the occurrence
of hazardous states in a system, and more generally rendering the latter more opaque for its operators and managers, thus
resulting in safety blind spots. This in turn translates into a shrinking of the time window available for operators to identify
an unfolding hazardous condition or situation and intervene to abate it. To prevent this drawback from materializing, we
propose in this work a novel safety principle termed “observability-in-depth”. We characterize it as the set of provisions
technical, operational, and organizational designed to enable the monitoring and identification of emerging hazardous
conditions and accident pathogens in real-time and over different time-scales. Observability-in-depth also requires the
monitoring of conditions of all safety barriers that implement defense-in-depth; and in so doing it supports sensemaking
of identified hazardous conditions, and the understanding of potential accident sequences that might follow (how they can
propagate). Observability-in-depth is thus an information-centric principle, and its importance in accident prevention is in
the value of the information it provides and actions or safety interventions it spurs.
We examine several “event reports” from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission database, which illustrate specific
instances of violation of the observability-in-depth safety principle and the consequences that followed (e.g., unmonitored
releases and loss of containments). We also revisit the Three Mile Island accident in light of the proposed principle, and
identify causes and consequences of the lack of observability-in-depth related to this accident sequence. We illustrate both
the benefits of adopting the observability-in-depth safety principle and the adverse consequences when this principle is
violated or not implemented. This work constitutes a first step in the development of the observability-in-depth safety
principle, and we hope this effort invites other researchers and safety professionals to further explore and develop this
principle and its implementation.
KEYWORDS : Observability-in-depth, Accident Pathogen, Latent Failure, Defense-in-depth, Safety Blind Spot

1. INTRODUCTION
Defense-in-depth is a fundamental safety principle
for the design and operation of nuclear power plants. It is
the basis for risk-informed decisions by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) [1–3]. In its bare essence,
defense-in-depth consists in the design and implementation of multiple safety barriers, technical, procedural, and
organizational, and whose objective is first to prevent ac-
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cident initiating events from occurring, second to block
accident sequences from escalating, and third to mitigate
adverse consequences should the previous barriers fail.
Accidents typically result from the absence, inadequacy,
or breach of such defenses [4,5]. The purpose of defensein-depth is to compensate for uncertainties, inadequacies,
or incompleteness in risk analysis, and ultimately “to
protect the plant, the plant operators, and the health and
safety of the public” from adverse events [6]. Safety
within the context of defense-in-depth should not be contingent on a single defensive element, hence the “depth”
qualifier. Although there is yet no official definition of
defense-in-depth by the NRC, whenever the term is used
and a definition needed, one is created that is consistent
with the intended use of the term [1]. There is however a
general agreement on the need for defense-in-depth, its
803
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objectives, the approach to achieve its goals, and the criteria to guide its implementation. A careful review of the
different perspectives and uses of the term defense-indepth is available in [6]. For our present purposes, the
nuances in the different definitions of defense-in-depth
are not relevant, and the (functional) definition provided
above is sufficient for the discussion that follows, namely
that defense-in-depth is defined by and embodied in the
design of, and provisions for, diverse and multiple safety
barriers, technical, procedural, and organizational, and whose
objectives are the prevention of accident initiating events,
the blocking of accident sequences, and the mitigation or
containment of accident consequences2. It is worth clarifying
that defense-in-depth can be implemented in many ways
and it requires significant ingenuity—technical, operational,
organizational, and regulatory—to conceive and implement
in a variety of contexts and for dealing with different types
of hazards and uncertainties. An attempt at formalizing
defense-in-depth and quantifying its effects can be found
in [7].
Despite its general appeal, defense-in-depth is not
without its drawbacks [8,9]. For example, its successive
lines of defense can (inadvertently) enhance mechanisms
that conceal the transition of a system to an increasingly
hazardous state, making “systems more […] opaque to
the people who manage and operate them” [8]. As a result,
system operators may be left blind to the possibility that
hazard escalation is occurring, thus decreasing their situational awareness and shortening the time they have to
intervene before an accident is released. In other words,
defense-in-depth may create safety blind spots and decrease situational awareness, which in turn translate into a
shrinking of the time window available for operators and
decision-makers to identify an unfolding hazardous condition or situation and intervene to abate it. Several accident reports identified hidden failures and unobservable
accidents pathogens as important contributing factors to
the accidents, the Three Mile Island and the Texas City
refinery accidents are such representative cases [10,11].
The NRC database for event reports contains about 90
cases of unmonitored release paths for contaminated air
and more than 1400 cases of loss of containment3. This
will be further examined in Section 3.
How can defense-in-depth enhance mechanisms that
conceal the transition of a system to an increasingly hazardous state, and thus create safety blind spots? There

are several pathways by which this can occur; we briefly
note herein two intuitive modes of occurrence, a physical
and a functional one:

2

Other or related pathways can also turn into hazard
concealment mechanisms, for example when the state of

 he understanding of defense-in-depth should not be restricted to
T
the physical barriers, e.g., fuel cladding and containment building.

3

The search, executed on the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) database,
for “unmonitored AND release AND path” returned 89 results,
while “loss AND containment” returned 1477 results (keywords in
the titles and abstracts of the reports). The database is available at
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx, and was queried
on 12/09/2013.
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● The physical pathway: the physical subset of safety
barriers in defense-in-depth are placed between
the energy source(s) and that which needs to be
protected, to avoid uncontrolled release of energy,
i.e., an accident, and to prevent harmful interaction between the energy source and that which is
not meant to be a sink for said energy. This view is
known as the energy model of accidents, and it has
led to the development of several safety strategies
(details can be found in [7]). The physical separation between energy source and individuals or resources to be protected can create obstacles to the
observation and monitoring of the situation behind
the (physical) safety barriers on the one hand, and
it can obfuscate the status or condition of barriers
on the other hand. For example, in underground
coalmines, after a particular section is mined and
abandoned (while the rest of the mine remains active), the section is sealed, and recommendations
are provided for the design and strength of this
safety barrier, i.e., the seal. If no additional precautions are taken, the barrier will obfuscate the
conditions in the sealed area, and since ventilation
is no longer available in that section, methane can
accumulate and reach dangerous explosive levels4.
In other words, the seal can create a safety blind spot
and leave the miners unaware than an explosive
mixture has built up behind the safety barrier. An ignition source would be the last remaining element to
transform this condition into an accident. The Sago
mine disaster in West Virginia (January 2006) in
which 12 miners were killed was the result of such
a situation [13].
● The functional pathway: defense-in-depth is intrinsically devised to slow down, minimize, or eliminate
the effects of local faults or failure events on the
overall safety and output of the system. Equivalently
this means that defense-in-depth is meant among
other things to decrease the sensitivity of the system
output to local faults or failures and not carry, or
highly attenuate, their “signature”. This constitutes
a degraded observability into the states of the system,
and unless specifically addressed, it can conceal the
transition of a system to an increasingly hazardous
state and thus create safety blind spots.

4

 ethane reaches an explosive range when its concentration in the
M
atmosphere reaches between 5% and 15% [12].
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the barrier itself is not monitored and no features are put
in place to assess its condition, as in the case of the Davis
Besse, which will be discussed in the next section.
To prevent this hazard-concealing potential of defensein-depth from materializing, we propose in this work a
safety principle termed “observability-in-depth”. We provide
the following preliminary definition of observability-indepth as:
1. the set of provisions, technical, operational, and organizational designed to enable the monitoring and
identification of emerging hazardous conditions and
accident pathogens in real-time and over different
time-scales;
2. the monitoring / reliable estimation of the conditions
and status of all safety barriers that implement the
defense-in-depth strategy (especially if they are
degraded or breached);
3. the support of sensemaking of the previously identified
hazardous conditions and accident pathogens, and the
understanding of potential accident sequences that
might follow (how they can propagate).
Observability-in-depth is fundamentally an informationcentric principle, and its importance in accident prevention
is in the value of the information it provides and actions
or safety interventions it spurs, as we will discuss shortly.
Observability-in-depth is intimately related to and supports
situational awareness at the operational and organizational
levels, and it allows us to conceive of a dynamic defense-indepth safety strategy in which some defensive resources,
safety barriers and others, are prioritized and re-allocated
dynamically in response to emerging risks [9,14]. More
details will follow in the next sections. It is worth clarifying
that observability-in-depth, just like defense-in-depth, can
be implemented in a variety of ways and it requires ingenuity—
technical, operational, and organizational—to conceive
and implement in different contexts and for dealing with
different types of hazards, accident pathogens, and safety
barriers.
Except in the nuclear industry where its use is more
mature and dynamic than in other industries, Probabilistic
Risk (or Safety) Assessment (PRA or PSA, here used interchangeably) has traditionally been performed offline
and used as a static tool to help identify and prioritize
various risks before system operation. The nuclear industry
has two concepts that go beyond the traditional static risk
analysis; they are the “Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment” or LPSA and the “risk monitors”. Living PSA is
defined as a safety assessment that is updated on a regular
basis, and the updates are done to account for “changes
in the design and operation of the plant, improvements in
how the plant behaves in fault conditions, and improvements in PSA methods, models, and data” [15]. Although
still an offline tool, LPSA offers an important methodological advance with respect to the traditional PSA in
that its models and data are not static but exhibit some
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, VOL.46 NO.6 DECEMBER 2014

discreet dynamics and evolve by jerks (when updated);
as such they are more useful and likely to reflect the actual risk status of a plant than static PSA. Risk monitors
provide a more continuous monitoring of certain risks in
a plant, and instead of the new aggregated averages that
LPSA provide, risk monitors are meant to provide “pointin-time risk for each plant configuration, … [given] the
current plant alignments, component outages, and activities
being carried out that affect the risk and factors related
to the plant operational state” [15]. Risk monitors are
typically provided as software packages to nuclear power
plants, and they are used among other things to schedule
maintenance “to avoid peaks in risks [and] achieve greater
flexibility in plant operation” [15]. Observability-indepth introduces an online (real-time) mind-set into risk
analysis and management, and it provides a broad strategic
heading under which other tools and concepts such as
LPSA, risk monitors, and prognostic and health management
can be subsumed. Observability-in-depth supports the
development of an online probabilistic safety assessment
(not just a “living” one, as discussed previously), and this
in turn can help dynamically re-order risk priorities based on
emerging hazards, and re-allocate some defensive resources
accordingly.
The objective of this work is to introduce the nuclear
industry community to the observability-in-depth safety
principle, and to make the case that it ought to be considered an important complement to the defense-in-depth
safety strategy. We illustrate some of the adverse consequences when this principle is violated or not implemented
using several recent “event reports” from the NRC database.
By the same token, we identify the set of problems that fall
within the scope of observability-in-depth and which this
principle can help address or prevent. We also revisit the
Three Mile Island accident and identify consequences of
the lack of observability related to this accident sequence,
and the failure to prevent it from unfolding in a timely
manner.
This work constitutes a first step in the development of
the observability-in-depth safety principle, and we hope this
effort invites other researchers and safety professionals
to further explore and develop this principle. The remainder
of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the observability-in-depth safety principle and the many
ways it can be implemented. Section 3 examines the role
of observability-in-depth in the nuclear industry through
detailed analyses of cases selected from the NRC database
as well as the Three Mile Island accident. Section 4 concludes
this work.

2.	SAFETY DIAGNOSABILITY AND OBSERVABILITY-IN-DEPTH
Observability is a Control Theoretic concept, which
roughly indicates how well the internal states of a system
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can be inferred from the system’s inputs and outputs5.
More formally, a generic dynamical system given by Eq. (1)
(1)
is said to be observable if the knowledge of the set of
inputs u(t) and the set of outputs y(t) – measured from
some initial time t0 – are sufficient to obtain a unique
estimation of the system’s state vector x(t) for all future
instants following t0. Equation 1 indicates a functional
relationship between the evolution of the internal states
of the system and the system’s inputs and current states.
In Control Theory, the term state vector has a precise formal
definition and it constitutes the foundation for most analytical
techniques in this field. Roughly speaking, the state vector
of a system is the minimum set of variables that contain
all the necessary information about the internal condition
of a system at some time t0; and that knowledge, along
with the input(s) to the system (e.g., operators’ inputs) is
sufficient to determine the system’s outputs or behavior.
Observability in Control Theory, as noted previously,
is the ability to infer or estimate the internal system state
from the output of the system without having to measure
or “observe” that state directly (the distinction between
state vector, x(t) and system output y(t) is important; see
[14] and the references therein for details). Why or when
is this feature relevant? It is sometimes the case in complex
systems that the direct measurement and knowledge of
the entire state vector is not possible due to a variety
of reasons such as the lack of sensors, sensor hardware
limitations, or inefficient information distribution among
various subsystems of the plant. For example, in the case of
an aircraft or drone tracking a nominal path, the angle of
attack and the sideslip angle of the vehicle as well as the
rate of change of both angles are parts of the system state
(vector), since both the longitudinal and lateral dynamics
of the vehicle are related to these angles and their rates of
change. However, the accurate measurement of the two
angles and their rates of change is not always possible.
Their measurement would require, for example, accurate
knowledge of the local wind conditions at every instant
of time, which are often not available [14]. Observability
and techniques of state estimations allow us to infer the
vehicle’s state without having to directly measure them.

5

 he terms observability and diagnosability are used in a related
T
manner. While there are some differences between them (in their
domain of applicability and the nature of the underlying mathematical models they apply to, time-driven dynamical systems in
the first case and discrete event systems in the other), these differences are not relevant for our purposes, and we will occasionally use these two terms interchangeably. Observability-in-depth
remains the overarching category under which both observability
and diagnosability will be subsumed.
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Given this brief explanation of Observability in Control
theory and our previous definition of the observabilityin-depth safety principle, the reader may have noticed
that the two terms present some differences. Indeed while
observability-in-depth adopts its first term from Control
Theory, and it is inspired by the general quest of Observability
– namely figuring out or estimating the internal states of a
system for (better) decision-making purposes – the safety
principle is significantly broader than its counterpart in
Control Theory, and it is more constraining in terms of
requirements for compliance. Three important extensions
are worth making explicit:
1. A system may be observable in a control theoretic
sense, but if no provisions are taken to establish an
“observer” of its states6, its observability is meaningless since it is not acted upon, and as such it cannot
support better decision-making. Observability-indepth specifically requires among other things an
active scanning for potential hazardous conditions
and accident pathogens in a system, and that the
states of all safety barriers be observed (whether
directly or through estimation);
2. Another important extension is in relation to accident pathogens: accident pathogens can be thought
of as adverse latent conditions or failures, which
compounded with other factors can further advance
an accident sequence, precipitate an accident, or
aggravate its consequences. An accident pathogen
is thus a distinctive causal factor in an accident sequence, and it is inactive or lurking until triggered
by other factors. Accident pathogens by definition
have no visible effect on the system’s output under
nominal operating conditions, and as such they are
not observable in a control theoretic sense. Yet these
are specifically what observability-in-depth is meant
to scan for and identify (among other things). Since
state estimation (observability in a control theoretic
sense) is not possible for these conditions, direct
observation and monitoring is required for accident
pathogens7.
3. Finally, observability in a control-theoretic sense
deals with system’s inputs and outputs to estimate
the quasi-current state of the system8. It is thus quasiretrospective in nature. Observability-in-depth, on

6

An observer in Control Theory is typically an algorithmic feature
put in place to perform the state estimation of a system.

7

Accident pathogens may be in the degraded states of the defensein-depth provisions, lessening their defensive potential. It is important to ensure that such pathogens are continuously scanned for
and monitored so that operators and decision-makers do not rely
on a misleading estimation of the efficiency of available defensive
resources for accident prevention.

8

There is typically a time delay (even if it is very short) associated
with and required for performing the state estimation.
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the other hand, requires additional information
(e.g., triggering thresholds of accidents on certain
state variables), and it includes an important aspect
of predicting the propagation of current states to
assess potential accident sequences that might follow
(sensemaking). In this sense, observability-in-depth
has a significant prospective dimension.
In short, it is proper to acknowledge that observabilityin-depth borrows the concept of observability from Control
Theory with its emphasis on the knowledge of the internal
states of a system toward an improved decision-making
and control (in our case, accident prevention). However,
beyond this general similarity, the two terms are different in
their scope and implications: the safety principle is significantly
broader than its counterpart in Control Theory; it is also
more constraining in terms of requirements for compliance; and
it is meant to address specific unsafe conditions (states)
that are beyond the “field of view” of observability in a
control theoretic sense9.
The ability to observe or diagnose the transition of a
system to a hazardous state or the occurrence of a safetydegrading event is critical for the continued safety of
operations. Roughly speaking, operators make decisions
during system operation, which are both based on and
affect the internal conditions/states of the system [16]. If the
internal system states are not reliably observed or estimated
(and reported), there is a distinct possibility that operators
will make flawed decisions, which in turn can compromise
the safe operation of the system or fail to check the escalation
of an accident sequence (e.g., no decision when an intervention
is warranted).

To better illustrate the importance of the notion of
observability of hazardous states, consider the following
illustrative example10. A system departs from nominal
operating conditions and begins drifting toward an increasingly hazardous state as shown in Figure 1. Various
safety barriers can be interposed between the nominal
operating conditions (states) and the accident release (for
some specifics about this point, in ref. [11] for example,
the system is a splitting tower at an oil refinery, which
is filling up with hydrocarbon. The barriers are safety
pressure valves and specific design features designed to
contain any overflow before the accident, namely loss
of containment, occurs). We represent the accident trajectory by plotting the evolution over time of the hazard
level of the system, here considered loosely speaking as
the closeness of the accident to being released. Assume
that safety barriers are implemented to prevent the system from reaching hazard level H0 in Figure 1, and that
additional barriers are in place to block further escalation
past H1 and H2 should the previous barriers fail or prove
inadequate.
The solid line in Figure 1 represents the actual hazard
level of the current state of the system, hereafter noted as
H(t), while the dashed line represents the operators’ assumed
hazard level, Ĥ(t), estimated from available information
or through direct sensor observation.
The gap between these two quantities, the actual and
the estimated hazard levels can be noted as:
(2)

Fig. 1. Schematic Representation of System Diagnosability/Observability, Adapted from [11]

9

The used word “observed” hereafter is not meant to be understood in
its restricted control theoretic sense but its broader sense of directly
observed, monitored, or reliably estimated.
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 his is based on ref. [11] by the authors and it is included here for
T
convenience and illustrative purposes.
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This gap can result for example from the absence of
observability into hazardous conditions in the system
(e.g., missing sensors), or degraded observability (e.g.,
miscalibrated sensors or covered gauges), which can
mislead the operators about the actual state of the system.
Examples of these situations will be examined shortly.
In a previous work [11], we argued that all safety-degrading events or hazardous states that defense-in-depth
is meant to protect against be diagnosable, that is, the
failure or breach of any element in the implementation
of defense-in-depth be observable—directly monitored
or reliably estimated. This constitutes one aspect of the
observability-in-depth safety principle. This principle
implies among other things, and as a first step, that safetycritical elements in a system be properly instrumented to
reflect their actual state, the extent of their degradation if
any, and their breach if or when that occurs. Many examples
of accidents occurred, or were not prevented in a timely
manner, because of a lack of implementation of this principle.
We will examine such cases in Section 3.
In light of Figure 1, the purpose of observability-indepth is (i) to minimize the gap between the actual and
the estimated hazard levels (ΔH), and (ii) to ensure that at
the hazards levels associated with various safety barriers, H0,
H1, and H2 in the figure, the two curves coincide if these
hazard levels are reached (e.g., ΔH = 0 if H0 is reached—
the safety barriers designed to prevent the system from
reaching H0 is breached). The end-objective is to provide
sufficient time for the operators and decision-makers to
understand an unfolding hazardous situation and intervene
in a timely manner to abate it. By contrast, a persistent
gap between the actual and the estimated hazard levels, as
shown in Figure 1, leaves the operators and decision-makers
blind to the developing hazardous situation, and it shrinks
the time window, and options, available to intervene.
A gap between the actual and the estimated hazard reflects degraded situational awareness. In [11], we noted that
the concept of situation awareness involves an operator’s
comprehension of a dynamic situation that he/she is
monitoring or controlling [17; 18]. It is an important
construct in cognitive engineering and is meant to capture,
among other things, the operator’s “understanding of the
state of the environment, including relevant parameters
of the system” [19].
As such, observability-in-depth is intimately related to
situational awareness, and it supports one important subset
of the latter, namely the awareness of the occurrence of
hazardous states in the system, and the understanding of
the potential accident sequences that might follow.
Consider the following example, which highlights
one potentially catastrophic consequence of the lack of
observability-in-depth with respect to a particular safety
element in a nuclear power plant. The incident occurred
at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. In March 2002
a cavity of about 20-30 square inches was discovered in
808

the reactor lid during an inspection targeted for reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration (VHP) nozzle
cracking due to primary water stress corrosion [20]. The
discovery of the cavity was in a sense fortuitous:
 During these inspections, the licensee discovered
“
cracks in several VHP nozzles. Subsequent to the
machining process to repair VHP Nozzle 3, the nozzle was observed to displace, or tip in the downhill direction as the machining apparatus was withdrawn. The
displacement led DBNPS personnel to examine the
region adjacent to VHP Nozzle 3” [20].
The cavity “extended completely through the 6.63 inch
thick carbon steel reactor pressure vessel head down to a
thin internal liner of stainless steel cladding” [20]. The
degradation and breach of the reactor lid developed over
an extended period of time unbeknown to the operators and
plant managers. It was due to corrosion from a leak of boric
acid. This lack of observability of the state or degradation
of the reactor pressure vessel head barrier could have resulted
in a massive loss of coolant with potential meltdown of
the reactor [20]. This was a serious near miss, and the only
element that prevented an accident from occurring was
the internal cladding, which withstood the primary system
pressure over the cavity during system operation and was
neither designed for nor qualified to perform such function
[20].
There are a number of lessons to be learned from
this near miss at the Davis-Besse power plant, and many
recommendations were provided in the NRC report [20],
including for example heightened regulatory oversight
of the plant. In addition to the specific recommendations
provided, we propose that this and many other similar
near misses support a more general recommendation,
namely the adoption of the observability-in-depth safety
principle, which was violated in this case, and whose
implementation could have identified the degradation of
this RPV safety barrier in a more timely manner.
Observability-in-depth can be implemented in many
ways, and it requires creativity and technical ingenuity
to design and implement in a variety of contexts and for
monitoring different types of hazards and states of safety
barriers. Regulations cannot be prescriptive in this regard, but
a safety case can be required from the designers/operators
to demonstrate compliance with this principle.
The “depth” qualifier in observability-in-depth serves
two purposes, and it has both a temporal and causal dimension, as explained next.
First “depth” is used to distinguish the safety principle
from the control theoretic concept of observability, and
without which some confusion might arise as to the use
and meaning of the term, especially among readers who
are Control-literate (see earlier discussion on the similarities and differences between these two terms). Second
“depth” in observability is meant to provide a parallel to
“depth” in defense-in-depth in the following sense: whatever
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, VOL.46 NO.6 DECEMBER 2014
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Fig. 2. Schematic Illustration of an Accident Sequence, Defense-in-depth, and the Causal Dimension of “Depth” in Observability-in-depth

“level” of depth safety barriers are placed at (in a potential
accident sequence), observability-in-depth is meant to
chaperone each safety barrier to monitor its condition
and status.
As noted previously, observability-in-depth characterizes the ability to identify adverse states and conditions
far upstream (early) in an accident sequence. It also reflects the ability to observe emerging accident pathogens
and latent failures before their effect becomes manifest
on the system’s output, or before an increasingly hazardous
transition occurs in an accident sequence. “Depth”, as a
result, has both a temporal and a causal dimension.
To appreciate its temporal dimension, consider Figure
1 and assume that an initiating event triggers an accident
sequence. During the accident sequence, the time of occurrence of the accident is unknown and preferably rightcensored (i.e., it will be averted). We noted this time in
Figure 1 as tA+. Looking back form the vantage point of the
time of occurrence of the accident (tA+ as the origin of the new
clock), the further away we can identify hazardous states or
transitions, the more depth we have in the implementation of
our safety principle. In other words, the temporal dimension
of observability-in-depth is reflected in the δt shown in
Figure 1, with δt0 reflecting more depth of observability
than δt1.
To appreciate the causal dimension of “depth” in observability-in-depth, consider Figure 2, which represents
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, VOL.46 NO.6 DECEMBER 2014

a set of safety barriers and various hazardous states. Each
hazardous transition/escalation in an accident sequence
has a set of underlying causes, and Figure 2 includes the
underlying causes of a transition from Si to Sj in the form
of a Fault Tree.
The condition Pi in the fault tree is a latent failure or
accident pathogen [21]; it does not have a visible effect
on the system behaviour or operation, until the second
condition in its AND gate occurs. If the system reaches
state Si, the hazardous transition to Sj will occur, thus further
advancing the accident sequence. The ability to observe
such latent causal factors or accident pathogens in an accident
sequence before they have a visible effect on the system
operation is another aspect of the depthness of observability.
In other words, the “further down” a fault tree are adverse
conditions identified, the more depth there is to the observability-in-depth principle.

3.	EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
WHEN OBSERVABILITY-IN-DEPTH IS COMPROMISED OR NOT IMPLEMENTED
In this section we provide a few examples that illustrate
some of the adverse consequences that can follow from
the lack of, or degraded, observability into hazardous
conditions. The purpose is to show both the importance
809
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of observability-in-depth by examining cases when it is not
implemented, and by the same token to highlight the set of
problems that it can help address or prevent. We begin with
the well-known Three Mile Island accident and examine it
from this perspective of observability-in-depth (or deficiencies
in). Then we discuss several “event reports” from the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission database, which reflect
potential concealment of accident pathogens in the lines
of defense.

3.1 The Archetype Case Study: the Three Mile Island
Accident

The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident of March 1979
is perhaps the most famous incidents in the history of
nuclear power plants in the United States. A complex
sequence of events led to the loss of the water-coolant,
which resulted in a partial core meltdown [10] and caused
over $2 billion in damages [22].
The chain of causality leading to the accident has
been widely discussed, see for example [10, 23, 24], and
the accident became the subject of numerous debates for
the complexity of the sequence of events starting from
a leaky valve and emergency pump shutdown and leading
to the reactor partial meltdown. The accident resulted
from a combination of factors, including four separate
malfunctions in the internal and external cooling circuits,
overall sloppy maintenance and organizational deficiencies11 [10, 23], and operators’ errors. Our purpose here
is not to revisit the accident sequence, but to examine it

from one particular perspective, namely that of observability-in-depth, and to highlight how deficiencies in the
implementation of this principle contributed to the accident sequence or failed to prevent its escalation. Some
brief technical knowledge is required for our discussion.
A schematic representation of the reactor core with the
cooling system circuits is shown in Figure 3.
The heat generated by the reactor core at the TMI
plant was removed by a heat exchanger at the intersection
of two cooling circuits: a primary internal circuit directly
connected to the reactor core, and a secondary external
circuit connected to steam turbines (see Figure 3). Main
pumps as well as emergency backups and pressure relief
valves existed for both the internal and external circuits.
Steam downstream of the heat exchanger drove the turbines
(the power generation elements). This particular design, as
well as the main pumps and emergency backups, and the
pressure relief valves are specific elements in the implementation of defense-in-depth. And while they were particularly important for the safe operation of the plant, the
fact that observability-in-depth was lacking or compromised
in their design, as we will discuss shortly, rendered this a
defense-blind strategy. Moreover, the inability to observe
and assess the states of some of these safety barriers not
only failed to prevent the escalation of the accident sequence,
but also directly contributed to its advancement. In short,
we argue that the Three Mile Island accident was to a large
extent the result of a violation of the observability-in-depth
safety principle, and while its proper implementation would

Fig. 3. Simplified Schematic of the Reactor Core and the Cooling Circuits, Adapted from [26]

11

 orinson et al. [25] and Hopkins [10] highlight how events similar to those indicated in Figure 4 had occurred in an incident 18 months earlier
G
at the Davis-Besse reactor. Also previous failures of the relief valves had been witnessed in reactors manufactured by the same firm of the TMI
plant. These and other near misses and warning signs apparently went unnoticed by the management of the TMI nuclear reactor.
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not have prevented the initiating events from occurring—some
of the factors noted previously were directly responsible
for this, namely technical failures, sloppy maintenance,
and organizational deficiencies—it would have ensured
that the accident sequence was terminated in a timely

manner before core meltdown.
The accident sequence mainly concerned the primary
and secondary cooling circuits of the reactor core. A simplified overview of the events that led to the reactor core
partial meltdown in shown in Figure 4.

Fig. 4. Simplified Accident Sequence
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, VOL.46 NO.6 DECEMBER 2014
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The accident sequence was triggered by a leak in the
external cooling circuit, which caused the main pumps to
shut down [10]. Two days prior to this event, the emergency pumps of the external circuit had been shut down
for maintenance work and were still inoperable. This condition, apparently unknown to the operators at the time of
the accident (first unobserved latent adverse condition),
led to the impossibility to dissipate the heat from the internal circuit. As a result, the reactor core began to overheat,
leading to its preventive shutdown. However, the pressure
in the internal circuit kept increasing due to “decay heat”
from the reactor core [10]. At this point, the emergency relief valve of the internal circuit opened, letting the coolant
escape and lowering the pressure to the nominal value.
The relief valve should have closed when the pressure
fell to proper levels, but it became stuck open. Instruments
in the control room however indicated that the valve was
closed [26]. The decrease in pressure activated the emergency
high-pressure injection pumps in the internal circuit to
prevent the core meltdown [10]. After noticing the pressure
rise in the internal circuit, the operators were unaware of
the loss of coolant from the internal circuit. This is the
second major unobserved condition in this accident sequence,
and it was due not only to the flawed sensor that was
monitoring the status of the relief valve, but also to the
absence of provisions to directly monitor and estimate the
coolant flow in the primary internal circuit12. We conceive
of this situation as a gross violation of the observability-indepth safety principle—two major elements in the implementation of defense-in-depth were not properly monitored
and their status not directly observable.
The operators, still unaware of the loss of coolant from
the internal circuit, manually throttled down the emergency
pumps. This was considered in hindsight as a significant
operator error and it led directly to the accident—the reactor’s
(partial) core meltdown. However, as shown here, this
decision was the result of flawed or missing information
that degraded the operators situational awareness and
failed to convey the hazardous conditions of various
safety barriers. It took them about 2 hours and 20 minutes
to understand that a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
was ongoing. The total meltdown was then prevented by
flooding the reactor core with cold water. While this extreme
measure prevented the release of radioactive material,
major irreversible damage had already been done [10].

12

 e thank a reviewer for providing the following clarification, that for
W
the TMI power plant, indicators of the auxiliary the feedwater block
valves position existed. However, tags covered those indicators –
an inadvertent outcome of bad practice. The impossibility for the
operators to observe the correct position of the valves, whether
stemming from design flaws, bad practice, or other mechanisms,
constitutes a violation of the OID principle. These mechanisms
contribute to the incorrect estimation of the plant condition, hence
deteriorating the operator situational awareness.
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Different authors have debated at length the controversial issue of “operator error” in the early termination
of the high-pressure injection pumps [10, 23]. Hopkins
points out that, “had the pumps been allowed to continue
operating, the accident could have been avoided” [10].
The “design flaws” of the relief valve and its monitoring
system caused the control room to receive an incorrect
signal of its position. The operators then acted on this incorrect understanding of the plant condition. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no explanation in the literature
as to why this condition unfolded.
The impossibility to monitor and diagnose an ongoing
LOCA from the relief valve status is not the only violation of observability-in-depth. For instance, there was no
instrument that allowed the operator to understand how
much water covered the reactor core [26]. The time history
of the water level could have improved the situational
awareness of the operators and their understanding of the
actual hazard level reached by the reactor.
Perrow choose this accident as the archetype of his
“normal accident theory”, where an accident “is termed
normal because it is inherent in the characteristics of
tightly coupled, complex systems and cannot be avoided”
[23]. The normal accident argument, and specifically
its applicability to the TMI accident, was criticized by
Hopkins [10]. In his work, Hopkins provides a careful
analysis of Perrow’s point of view and notes that “Perrow claim[ed] that the information available to the operators [was] so flawed that there was no way they could
have been expected to understand what was going on and
react in an effective manner” [10]. Perrow’s conclusion
based on this observation is that the accident was indeed
a “normal” occurrence, in the sense that its incomprehensible nature made prevention impossible. We agree
that the flawed and missing information about the status
of critical safety elements at TMI degraded the operators’
situational awareness and hampered their ability to safely
operate the plant. However instead of conceiving and accepting this and similar accidents as “normal”, we trace
back one important element in their causal chain, namely
the lack of observability of emerging hazardous states,
and we conceive of a safety principle, observability-indepth, whose implementation can help prevent similar
occurrences.

3.2 O
 bservability-in-depth and the NRC Database of
Licensee Event Reports

In this subsection we discuss several event reports
from the NRC’s Licensee Event Reports (LER) database,
which illustrate more situations that can results from the
lack of, or degraded, observability into hazardous conditions.
By the same token, theses examples highlight an additional
set of problems that fall within the scope of observabilityin-depth and which this safety principle can help address
or prevent.
Caveat: It is important to note that this subsection
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does not constitute nor should it be considered a basis for
statistical analysis of the problem of lack of observability of
adverse conditions in the LER database—although this
would be an interesting topic and a fruitful venue for future research. This subsection is merely for illustrative
purposes and to better delineate the scope and extent of
observability-in-depth.
The NRC has required nuclear power plants to submit
LER since 1980, and more than 51,00013 of these reports
have since been submitted. Commercial nuclear reactor
licensees are required to report certain event information
when adverse conditions occur in a nuclear power plant,
which are beyond its technical specifications [27, 28]. For
example, the malfunction of a required safety barrier or
the discovery of a potential design flaw would trigger the
need for an LER. Once an LER is submitted, NRC staff
review it to understand and confirm the licensee’s assessment of the situation. NRC staff experts also determine
whether the licensee’s resolution of the issue continues to
maintain adequate levels of safety and protection of the
public [29]. The NRC provides public online access to
the LER database. Each report consists of an abstract, a
description of the events sequence, the event significance
and implications, the identified causes, the implemented
corrective actions, and additional information (e.g. information on similar previous occurrences).
Compared with the case study approach in Subsection
3.1, event reports (LER) allow the discussion of a broader
set of situations, as the events reported are usually less
serious in terms of their consequences and their occurrence
relatively straightforward (or not as involved as in the
TMI accident).
● CASE I – Inoperable emergency diesel generator
due to low fuel oil in storage tank [30]: this case
resulted from incorrect readings of the level of fuel
oil contained in the storage tank of an emergency
diesel generator. A low level of fuel oil (below the
required minimum) was discovered during an inspection and investigation revealed that incorrect
readings had been going on for more than a month.
According to the report “the primary cause was a
challenging method for determining tank level”
[30]. The level indicator reading was also susceptible
to exogenous disturbances, becoming “more unreliable
under adverse conditions (e.g., poor weather, low
light conditions)” [30]. Contributing factors included
also a malfunctioning tank level indicator and the
corresponding alarm. The investigation highlighted
the “inadequate instrument design” of the fuel oil
tank level alarm and the indicator.
	 While this situation did not pose a considerable

13
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threat to the safety of the plant, it constituted a latent
failure or adverse pre-existing condition, which
when compounded with other factors, could have
further advanced an accident sequence, for example
if the emergency generators were called upon. As such,
this condition constitutes a non-negligible accident
pathogen [21]. The fact that it was not observable
or its observability compromised is an instance of
failed implementation of the observability-in-depth
principle (specifically in this case a redundant safety
barrier was inoperable and its breach was not monitored
or reliably observable).
● CASE II – Unmonitored Flowpath in Safety Injection
Cooling Pumps [31]: In this case a review of the
pump testing surveillances showed that unmonitored flowpaths existed for different pumps, including
the safety injection pump of the cooling system at
the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. According
to the report, the regulations current at the time of
the system design, did not “explicitly require” [31]
to monitor the total pump flow. The unmonitored
flowpaths diverted flow from the pump discharge prior
to the point at which the flow measurement was taken,
hence resulting in a condition of compromised observability of the pump flow.
		 At the time of the instrumentation design, the
potential impact of unmonitored flowpaths on the
ability to test in order to detect pump degradation
was not fully realized [31]. Indeed, unmonitored
flowpaths have the potential to mask the detection
of pump degradation by altering the expected measurements of flow and differential pressure. As with
the previous case, this condition compromises the
observability of the state of the pump, thus allowing
an accident pathogen to emerge and go unnoticed.
● CASE III – Design Deficiency - Potential for an
Unmonitored Release Path [32]: In this case an
unmonitored release path of contaminated air was
identified during an engineering evaluation of the
station service water system circuit. The identified
condition would allow “contaminated air to enter
the service water piping [...] and to subsequently
be released to the outside environment” in case of
a Loss of Power/Loss of Coolant Accident event,
thus resulting in a loss of secondary containment
[32].
	 The failure to identify this release path was considered
in the report as non-compliance with General Design
Criteria. Moreover, it shows the inability to observe
a potential accident sequence. In other words, in
case of loss of secondary containment through this
particular path, the operators would not be able to
identify the release of the contaminated air to the
outside environment. Observability-in-depth was in
this case violated by this particular release path.
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Table 1. Selected LER – search Keywords and Scenarios Summary
Case ID and Event Report #

Keyword

Highlighted Scenario

I - 3521996022

Malfunctioning Indicator

Compromised/degraded observation

II - 4231998027

Unmonitored

Compromised observation

III - 3541997025

Unmonitored

Unobserved

IV - 2451997037

Unmonitored

Unobserved

● CASE IV – Unmonitored Release Path Due to Radioactive Ash [33]: In this case an unmonitored release path of contaminated ash was identified during
the preparations to put a heating boiler into service
for the winter season. The event report established
that “if the ash on the fire side of the boiler contains
radioactive constituents, some of the particulate matter
could be discharged through the boiler exhaust” [33].
	 This event may appear less severe and unremarkable
compared with the previous ones. But the interesting
point here is that the ashes in the boiler resulted
from an original contamination and leak that occurred
25 years before the discovery of the unmonitored
release path. This constitutes an interesting example
not only of the unobserved accident pathogen, but
also of the lack of a defense barrier against the release
of the contaminated ashes.
These cases only represent the tip of the iceberg of
instances of adverse conditions that can be gleaned from
the LER database, and which can be considered in some
ways instances of violation of observability-in-depth.
Further examination of this database for events that include
unobserved adverse conditions and breaches of safety barriers
would be a fruitful venue for future research.

4. CONCLUSION
To prevent the hazard-concealing potential of defensein-depth from materializing, and more generally to introduce
a real-time mind-set into risk analysis and management, we
proposed in this work a safety principle termed observabilityin-depth, which helps focus attention on these issues. We
defined it as:
1. the set of provisions, technical, operational, and organizational designed to enable the monitoring and
identification of emerging hazardous conditions and
accident pathogens in real-time and over different
time-scales;
2. the monitoring / reliable estimation of the conditions
and status of all safety barriers that implement the
defense-in-depth strategy (especially if they are
degraded or breached);
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3. the sensemaking of the emerging hazardous conditions
and the understanding of potential accident sequences
that might follow (and how they can propagate).
In this sense, observability-in-depth should be thought of
as a complement to the well-established defense-in-depth
safety strategy, without which the latter can devolve into
a defense-blind safety strategy. Observability-in-depth is
thus fundamentally an information-centric principle, and
its importance in accident prevention is in the value of the
information it provides and actions or safety interventions
it spurs.
One objective of observability-in-depth is to minimize
the gap between the actual and the estimated hazard levels
in a system in real-time, and in so doing to provide sufficient
time for the operators and decision-makers to understand
an unfolding hazardous situation and intervene in a timely
manner to abate it. As such, we proposed that observabilityin-depth is intimately related to situational awareness, and
it supports one important aspect of the latter, namely the
awareness of the occurrence of hazardous states in the
system in real time, and the understanding of the potential
accident sequences that might follow (sensemaking of the
emerging hazardous conditions). The hazardous states can
be technical, operational, or organizational. We explained
that the depth qualifier in our principle has both a causal
and a temporal dimension, and it is meant to characterize the
ability to identify adverse states and conditions far upstream
in an accident sequence.
Changing mind-sets: Probability Risk Assessment
(PRA) has traditionally been performed offline and used
as a static tool to help identify and prioritize various risks
before system operation (see caveat in the Introduction
about the status of PRA in the nuclear industry). Similarly,
defense-in-depth has to some extent an implicit static
connotation. Observability-in-depth introduces a real-time
mind-set into risk analysis and management, and it supports
the development of an online probabilistic risk assessment,
which in turn can help dynamically re-order risk priorities
based on emerging hazards, and re-allocate some defensive
resources accordingly. As such, observability-in-depth can
help conceive of a dynamic defense-in-depth safety
strategy in which some defensive resources, safety barriers
and others, are prioritized and allocated dynamically in
response to emerging risks.
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Observability-in-depth extends beyond specific techniques, alarms, and instrumentations, and it provides a
broad strategic heading under which tools and techniques
such as living probabilistic safety assessment (LPSA),
risk monitors, and prognostic and health management
can be subsumed.
This work constitutes a first step in the development of
the observability-in-depth safety principle, and we hope this
effort invites other researchers and safety professionals
to further explore and build on this principle. We believe
some fruitful venues for further research include examining:
i. 	the implementation of observability-in-depth in
specific contexts and at multiple scales, at the
technical and operational plant levels, and at the
industry level (different time scales will also have
to be accounted for);
ii. 	the extent to which observability-in-depth is required in specific contexts, and what changes (additions, deletions, modifications, etc.) would be
required to achieve appropriate levels;
iii. the integration of observability-in-depth and its
outputs into existing (living) probabilistic safety
assessments;
iv. 	the policy implications of observability-in-depth,
and the planning of a test case or pilot project for
its implementation;
v. 	(on a more theoretical level) the relationship / interplay between the three constructs: observabilityin-depth, situational awareness, and sensemaking.
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